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ABSTRACT 
Any general effort to account for the influence of ethnoreligiousity in the Philippines raises the question 
of the dominant role ethnoreligious politics has taken. Thus, the purpose of this article is to examine 
and analyze the role of ethnoreligious politics in the Philippines, using the Cultural Pluralist 
perspective. To this theory, the melting pot has never eradicated ethnoreligious politics in any given 
country.  It is divided into three parts. Firstly, it deals with the economic function of ethnoreligious 
politics in the region. Secondly, it looks into the psychological role of ethnoreligious politics. Lastly, 
examines the civic role of ethnoreligious politics in the Philippines. As shown in this article, many people 
in the Philippines have been unified from time to time by ethnoreligious bonds and used politics to 
secure material goals, to satisfy their psychic needs, and on occasion, to bring about fundamental 
changes in their civic values. Therefore, it is indicated that ethnoreligious politics serves as a tool in 
achieving their material desires, psychological needs, and recognition of their civic values.   
Keywords: Cultural Pluralist Perspective, Ethnoreligious Politics, Philippines 
ABSTRAK 
Setiap upaya umum dalam menjelaskan pengaruh etnoreligiusitas di Filipina menimbulkan pertanyaan 
mendasar tentang peran dominan yang diambil oleh politik etnoreligius. Dengan demikian, tujuan artikel 
ini adalah mengkaji dan menganalisis peran politik etnoreligius di Filipina dengan menggunakan 
perspektif Kultural Pluralis. Menurut teori ini, politik etnoreligius tidak dapat dihapuskan di negara 
mana pun. Hal ini berhubungan dengan tiga hal pokok. Pertama, berkaitan dengan fungsi ekonomi 
politik etnoreligius di wilayah tersebut. Kedua, melihat peran psikologis politik etnoreligius. Terakhir, 
mengkaji peran politik sipil etnoreligius di Filipina. Seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam artikel ini, banyak 
orang Filipina telah dipersatukan dari waktu ke waktu oleh ikatan etnoreligiusitas dan menggunakan 
politik etnoreligius untuk mengamankan tujuan material, memenuhi kebutuhan psikis, dan kadang-
kadang membawa perubahan mendasar dalam nilai-nilai kewarganegaraan mereka. Oleh karena itu, 
diindikasikan bahwa politik etnoreligius berfungsi sebagai alat untuk mencapai berbagai kepentingan 
dari para penganutnya. 
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PRELIMINARY 
Generally, divisive and often violent ethnoreligious politics have been a global 
phenomenon, which has torn apart many countries of the world. Many countries have suffered and 
some will continue to suffer from the brunt of ethnoreligious politics in their domestic conflicts. In 
the light of this, therefore, this article is quite timely and relevant in this period of the political 
history of the Philippines. We hope that the analysis will help our readers to have a better 
understanding of the most acute decades and domestic problems that the Philippine society 
confronts today. A few years ago, many pundits and political leaders mistakenly thought that we 
were about to close the chapter of ethnoreligious politics in the Philippines; that is, from politics to 
history, as a something of the past; when we all thought that the melting pot through Manila’s 
policy of integration seemed to had made remarkable progress towards its goal, that is, the 
attainment of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, in both practical and acceptable to the parties 
involved and would lead to the coexistence of ethnically and tribally divided society to a greater 
future, everything, however, turned to the other way round (Taya, 2010: 19-20).  
The failure of the peace agreements between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and 
the Bangsamoro revolutionary groups displayed a surprising persistence of discord and tension in 
the Philippines in general and in the Bangsamoro homeland in particular. This is a huge unfinished 
task of nation-building that the Manila government must pay attention to with urgency. Failure to 
do so may aggravate these distinctions that people have drawn along regional, economic, 
occupational, and ideological lines; they may involve clearly defined material and psychological 
interests which we already identified as “political”. Among the common distinctions that have 
brought people together are those which we designate as “ethnic” that is, those distinctions based 
on race, tribe, religion, language, and other broadly defined cultural attributes (Taya, 2010: 19-20).  
Such bond has natural and universal character as discussed in Ibn Khaldun’s “theory of assabiyah” 
(Khaldun, 2015; Amin, 2019).  
However, sometimes they cut across such divisions, but provide unity where none seemed 
to be possible. This is natural since affiliation not only would ensure one’s protection and safety 
but also provide an avenue of respect and recognition from other existing ethnoreligious groupings. 
Ethnoreligious politics should not be viewed as a parochial phenomenon, for there are few places 
on earth, developed or underdeveloped, where ethnoreligiosity is not presently of political 
significance.   
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In addition, these points merely scratch the surface. This is true, especially in the Southeast 
Asian region in general and in the Philippines, in particular. The Philippines is characterized by 
cultural, religious, and linguistic conglomeration, a fact that has led its polity to experience some 
share of ethnoreligious politics. With this, a fundamental question would arise: What is the function 
of ethnoreligious politics in promoting, preserving, and advancing the interest of each individual 
and their respective ethnoreligious groups? Thus, the objective of this article is to examine and 
analyze the function of ethnoreligious politics in the Philippines, using the Cultural Pluralist 
perspective.   
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The article used qualitative research methods. It relied on the historical-analytical approach, 
content analysis of official documents, and a wide range of secondary scholarly material sources. 
Interviews with respondents in the Bangsamoro homeland were also conducted. This method 
allowed us to examine and analyze the role of ethnoreligious politics in the Philippines. Thus, this 
article mainly highlighted how ethnoreligious politics is used as an instrument in pursuance of 
one’s individuals or collective interests. 
In assessing the role of ethnoreligious politics in the Philippines, this article utilized the 
theory of Cultural Pluralism. With the passage of time and the increasing trends of intermarriage, 
among other intensive and extensive human interactions, ethnic uniqueness has gradually 
diminished. What is striking, however, some argued, is not the scope and rapidity of assimilation, 
but rather the persistence of un-assimilated ethnoreligious identities of the Philippines society 
(Taya, 2010: 21-2). To this school of thought, the melting pot has never eradicated ethnoreligious 
politics in any given country. To these elements, the Philippines still retains rather clear, long-
standing ethnoreligious politics distinctions which are operative in the country’s social and political 
life and have shown every evidence of persistence. Rather than a melting pot, however, if not all 
countries-including the Philippines- is a patchwork of ethnoreligious politics enclaves. In 
correlation with the above, Taya stated thus: 
“The dominance of the Christian-Filipino culture should not force us to overlook the great 
variety of … minority group ties that still exist in the Philippines. He further noted that 
some argued that such proponents of cultural pluralism … cooperating voluntarily and 
autonomously, but within the united Philippines, in the enterprise of self-realization through 
the perfection of men according to their kind. Such has been the official stance of those 
westernized Bangsamoro intellectuals and political leaders.” (Taya, 2010: 21-2). 
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Thus, during the regime of then-President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1965–1986), there was a 
concerted effort to accommodate the Bangsamoro land through granting the region a measure of 
self-autonomy, but it was not implemented in good faith. During the time of former President 
Corazon C. Aquino (1986–1992), Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was 
created supposedly to fulfill the promise of the Philippines government to give self-determination 
to the Bangsamoro people through the leadership of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). 
The Philippines government partially implemented the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which the MNLF 
leadership rejected. As a result, the Aquino administration unilaterally implemented it and chose 
Zakaria Candao as the governor of the ARMM. Again, in 1996, Manila and MNLF signed the 1996 
Jakarta Agreement, which also failed to address the conflict in the region. Currently, the Philippine 
government under the watch of the Philippines President offered another autonomous government 
(BARMM) to replace the ARMM upon its ratification through a plebiscite on January 21st , 2019. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. Material Goals: Economic and Ethnoreligious Patronage 
Economic deprivation does explain the political pull of ethnoreligiousity. Most groups, 
especially the minority groups who were deprived of economic opportunities by the dominant 
groups and, particularly, the majority groups, were forced to join politics in order to provide 
essential social services and economic advancement. To achieve these goals, some deprived groups 
either actively worked within the existing legal framework or outside of it or both, joined politics. 
Schock’s work is a comprehensive model for understanding conflicts that drive ethnoreligious 
conflict and their right to secede. He discussed three theories of conflicts. One of those is the 
relative deprivation theory that can be defined as the perceived gap between people’s value 
expectations and their value abilities, that is, the discrepancy between what people think they 
should get from society’s abundance and what they believe they actually do get (Schock, 1996: 
101). 
In the light of the above, if we examine the case of the minorities in the Southern 
Philippines, in general, and the Bangsamoro people, in particular, there are several important 
economic reasons that forced the Bangsamoro and other minorities such as, the Indigenous Peoples 
(IPs) to turn to ethnoreligious politics. One of the most contentious issues is the issue of state 
sponsored-land-grabbing in the name of human settlement. In this context, successive Philippine 
governments were not just supporting the Christian-Filipino migrants from Luzon and Visayas to 
migrate to the Bangsamoro homeland, but more importantly, provided them with legal means to 
129 | Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Malikussaleh (JSPM) Volume 2 Nomor 2 Tahun 2021 
own Bangsamoro people’s lands. Manila also provided their financial means and security 
protection in their newly founded communities. In this regard, Taya quoted Ben J. Kadil and P. G. 
Gowing (1899-1920) as stating: 
“The Commonwealth Government envisaged land settlement to the Bangsamoro homeland 
through the legislative Act No. 4197, otherwise known as the Quirino-Recto Colonization 
Act. This paved the way for the massive influx of Christian-Filipino settlers in the region, 
the Southern Philippines, with the government’s backing and assistance. The Manila 
government had provided economic assistance and security forces for those who wanted to 
migrate to the region. Since then, land grabbing had been legalized at the expense of the 
Bangsamoro people. In 1936, President Manuel Quezon again signed a law, which declared 
all Bangsamoro Pusaka a Lupa (Ancestral Landholdings) as public land. This act, again, 
deprived the Bangsamoro’s of their ancestral lands, which they had owned, from their 
ancestors from time immemorial. This made the Bangsamoros landless, while this act best 
served the interests of the Christian-Filipino settlers, and more specifically, the capitalists 
and loggers.” (Taya, 2009: 3; Cited in Schock, 1996: 101). 
 
Furthermore, this land-grabbing was followed by a competition of other economic 
resources and political power between the Christian-Filipino settlers and the original inhabitants of 
the Southern Philippines, the Bangsamoro, and the Indigenous Peoples. Thus, the Bangsamoro 
community and other minorities became increasingly alarmed not just by the migration per se, but 
the magnitude of the migration of the Christian-Filipino settlers from Luzon and Visayas regions, 
which had made them a minority in their homeland (Taya, 2009: 3). 
When the United States granted Philippine independence in 1946, the Bangsamoro 
continued to resist the newly born nation’s rule that escalated into widespread conflict in the 1970s. 
The immediate reasons for the conflict was as a result of the increasing massacres, genocides, and 
other atrocities committed against the Bangsamoros by the Philippine government and its backed 
Christian-militia (ILAGA) in the Southern Philippines during the late 1960s. The Jabidah Massacre 
was the starting point, when Datu Udtog Matalam staged a rebellion in 1968 and eventually 
established the Mindanao Independent Movement (MIM), two months after the Jabidah Massacre 
on March 18th, 1968 (Taya, 2009: 3). 
In its initial phases, the rebellion was a series of isolated uprisings that rapidly spread in 
scope and size. But one group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), chaired by Nur 
Misuari, managed to bring most partisan Bangsamoro forces into a loosely unified MNLF 
framework. As a result of this, the vibrancy of Nur Misuari and the Bangsamoro leaders agreed 
that Nur Misuari be the chairman of the MNLF (Taya, 2009: 3). 
Fighting for an independent Bangsamoro nation, the MNLF received massive support from 
both homeland and foreign Muslim backers, more specifically, Libya, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
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and Malaysia. When the conflict reached its peak in 1973-75, the military arm of the MNLF, the 
Bangsamoro Army was able to field more or less 30,000-armed fighters (Taya, 2009: 3). The 
Philippine military responded by deploying 80 percent of its combat force against the Bangsamoro 
(Taya, 2009: 3). Destruction and casualties, both military and civilian, were heavy; and an 
estimated 50,000 people were killed (Taya, 2009). Also, from 1972 to 1976 an estimated 150,000 
Bangsamoros were killed, and more than 500,000 were forced to seek refuge in Sabah, Malaysia. 
In addition, more than one million were rendered homeless and destitute in the Southern 
Philippines (Bangsamoro Watch Center, 5; Cited also in Taya, 2009: 3). 
Accordingly, other factors that aggravated ethnoreligious politics in the Southern 
Philippines among other things is Manila’s naiveness and state of denial in addressing seriously 
the so-called Bangsamoro question. Before the Former Philippines President Aquino III and the 
current administration of President Duterte, the Christian-Filipinos’ political establishment was not 
serious in addressing the Bangsamoro problem through correcting historical injustice committed 
by the Philippines government against the Bangsamoro people. This can be seen through a series 
of political peace settlements signed by both parties.   For instance, the Two Peace Agreements 
(The 1976 Tripoli and the 1996 Jakarta Agreements) are the best illustration of this discrepancy. 
In this respect,  Buendia argued that the conclusion of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between 
Manila and MNLF did not terminate the separatist movement in the Southern Philippines (Buendia, 
2004: 205-6) because the Philippines government could not deliver the expectations of the MNLF 
and the Bangsamoro people. As a result, frustration and anger prevailed again. So, in 2001, Misuari 
staged the rebellion once again, which claimed more than a hundred lives. Rizal G. Buendia also 
noted the ignominious failure of Misuari to effectively wield governmental powers to attain the 
Bangsamoro’s quest for lasting and viable peace over their homeland was also a factor (Buendia, 
2004: 205-6). 
Allying with the above, therefore, ethnoreligiousity in the Southern Philippines and perhaps 
elsewhere is practically synonymous with low socioeconomic status in which members occupy 
minority positions of deprivation and discrimination, they aim to wrestle material benefits and 
values from the center. These peripheral groups knew that the dominant political groups would not 
voluntarily relinquish material values to the deprived areas at the same time, while the marginalized 
groups cannot live on the crumbs from the table of the dominant power-holders. Obviously, the 
onus of poverty, neglect and economic deprivation has led ethnoreligious politics in the south to 
seek political redress throughout the political history of the independent Philippines. Thus, based 
on the above analysis, it depicts that one of the causes of ethnoreligious politics in the Southern 
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Philippines is due to economic deprivation by the majority Christian-Filipino people over the 
Bangsamoro minority people in the region. 
 
2. Psychic Goals: The Esteem of the Victim 
Nation-building in the Philippines is considered by many observers as an unfinished task 
of the Philippines government. Since the onset of the country’s independence, the Manila political 
establishment has struggled to make a united nation by integrating the Bangsamoro people and 
other minority groups into the Philippines' national body politics. This was done through an 
establishment of an agency- the Commission on National Integration (CNI). CNI was tasked to 
formulate a national integration policy and carry it out to ensure obedience and success of 
Philippines nation-building. 
However, the Bangsamoro homeland was a uniquely illustrative case of challenges 
encountered at the intersection of post-colonialism and ethnoreligious disputes. When the United 
States granted independence to the Philippines in 1946, the Bangsamoro homeland faced a dilemma 
not just only of the annexation of their homeland into the Philippines sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, but worse is an attempt of Manila regimes to assimilate socially and culturally the 
Bangsamoro community into a dominant Christian-Filipinos’ values. So, proud of their Islamic 
cultural identity and independence, the Bangsamoro people bent on preserving them, which 
consequently led to a series of conflicts and often skirmishes between the Christian-Filipinos and 
the Bangsamoro. This hostile relation was succinctly described by Jeffrey Ayala Milligan (2005) 
in his work titled “Islamic Identity, Post-Coloniality and Educational Policy: Schooling and Ethno-
Religious Conflict in the Southern Philippines”, when he claimed that more than 65 percent of the 
Bangsamoro people surveyed in 1971 rejected the integration policy of the Philippines government 
and therefore, identified themselves as Bangsamoro rather than Filipinos (Milligan, 2005: 99-100). 
He also quoted Cesar Majul as noting that the fact that the Bangsamoro independence movements 
started to grow in the 1960s appeared that Philippines national integration failed to assimilate the 
bulk of the Bangsamoro community (Milligan, 2005: 99-100). 
Therefore, the ethnoreligious groups of the Southern Philippines, more specifically, the 
Bangsamoro people felt that their lack of status is due to discrimination and other structural 
inequalities designed and perpetuated by the Manila government. The movement for self-
determination in the Southern Philippines is generally attributed to the desire of many 
Bangsamoros to create their institutions to replenish social, psychological, and cultural values that 
could not find fulfillment in the larger Philippines society (Taya, 2009: 42). Bangsamoro 
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independence movements, in general, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in particular, 
developed distinct organizations and cultural practices to compensate for dissatisfaction over the 
existing antagonistic sociopolitical and cultural order of mainly dominated Christian-Filipino 
leadership. Politically, economically, culturally, and socially, the Bangsamoro were/are deprived 
and burdened with a deep feeling of socioeconomic and political inferiority. Many Bangsamoro 
lived in desolation and squalor, beset by every known kind of social pathology. 
Consequently, and as a result of the above, most of the Bangsamoro went to the extreme of 
calling attention to the existence of sistema a sarwang a governor or an internal colonial system” 
which has led to resource allocation along “tribal or religious lines.” For the ethnoreligious failure 
to achieve status, one could blame a discriminatory society, a society dominated by the 
Christianized elements, who also profess Christianity. Thus, the ethnic does not place the onus of 
poverty and material success in the individual. 
While concerned with the pursuit of material goals as a primary objective, ethnoreligious 
politics has also stressed compensatory efforts to acquire honor, dignity, respect, and self-esteem. 
Muslim best described this when he quoted Datu Pisang (famous Bangsamoro leader) as saying: 
“When the Spaniards ‘discovered’ these islands (the Southern Philippines) they found that 
civilization had already been established here, the religion and civilization of Islam. It was 
a good religion and a real civilization. You may remember also or have read that in all years, 
Spain was here and she never really conquered the Bangsamoro. Therefore, at the Treaty of 
Paris after the Spanish-American war, Spain had no right to give the Bangsamoro homeland 
to the United States, rights neither of discovery nor conquest. This is what the Bangsamoro 
is.” (Muslim, 1994: 49; Cited in Taya, 2010: 29). 
 
These feelings of rejection, to some, resulted in the withdrawal from Philippines politics, 
cultivate studied apathy, and the creation of social situations in which one was esteemed despite 
his ethnoreligious affiliation. This was the case, for instance, with some Bangsamoros who had 
attained material success and education and selected to live in the north. These are then some of 
the non-political ways in which ethnoreligious politics of the Philippines coped with the problems 
of group and individual self-esteem. 
However, ethnoreligious group members could not always resort to this sense of withdrawal 
and resignation. For the majority of ethnoreligious groups (such as the Maguindanao, Maranao, 
Tausug, Iranun, Yakan, and others) in the Southern Philippines, the political organization provided 
them an avenue for the stormy expression of psychic rewards, acute ethnoreligious resentment, and 
the longing for recognition of one’s human worth. The politics of separatism also provided 
ethnoreligious groups of the region with a means of seeking recognition and respect. A typical 
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example is the establishment of the MILF as an avenue to protect and advance the Bangsamoro 
multi- ethnoreligious groups in the Southern Philippines. These politics of recognition and respect 
was in most cases a search for confirmation that public officials in Manila would listen only to the 
marginalized Bangsamoro through the language of force, and thus, has a symbolic value to group 
members (Taya, 2010: 29). 
This feeling of neglect by ethnics was perhaps behind the blunt refusal of many 
Bangsamoros ethnoreligious groups to be part of the Philippines system. Because of the lack of 
recognition, and admittedly, by way of reaction, many of the aspirants for power fell back on their 
ethnic and regional constituencies, leading to the emergence of several ethnically based and 
possibly ethnically biased political movements. But this does not imply that all groupings are only 
purely ethnically-based associations or organizations. Some leading organizations are ethnically 
combined. 
Accordingly, unlike other Bangsamoro revolutionary groups- such as Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter 
(BIFF), Maute Group- the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) sought to unite co-ethnics into a 
broad political coalition with a common politico-religious creed transcending specific claims and 
identifications. In this respect, the MILF is a perfect referent of ethnically combined organizations. 
For instance, MILF members and leadership are composed of different tribes from 13 Bangsamoro 
ethnoreligious groups of the Southern Philippines. These include the Maguindanaon of Sultan 
Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sarangani, the Maranao of Lanao del 
Sur and Lanao de Norte, the Tausug of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan and Zamboanga provinces, the 
Sama of  Tawi-Tawi, the Yakan of Basilan, the Sangil of South Cotabato and Sarangani, the Badjao 
(Sama Dilaut) of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan, the Kalibugan of Zamboanga provinces, the  Jama 
Mapun of Tawi-Tawi, the Iranun of Lanao, Maguindanao and Cotabato provinces, the Kalagan of 
Davao provinces, the Palawani of Palawan and the Molbog of Southern Palawan. Therefore, a 
refusal by the Majority dominated Christian-Filipinos’ Philippine government to bestow 
recognition on members of the marginalized Bangsamoro community seems to be one of the given 
factors that led to the emergence of many ethnically-based organizations in the Southern 
Philippines, in general, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in particular. 
 
3. Civic Values as Ethnoreligious Political Goals 
Ethnic-based political behaviors have conditioned basic Christian-Filipino civic values that 
are the root ideas about the form and content of the controversial permanent Philippines 
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constitution of the country and the structure and purposes of the government itself. Such critical 
effects fly in the face of a core culture interpretation that holds inherited political values as 
sacrosanct and enduring. Two major examples will help to clarify this point: One is the great 
emphasis on government as an agency of collective benefits and the demand for the fair distribution 
of wealth and opportunities. While the other is the vehement and mounting opposition by the 
Christian-Filipinos against the Bangsamoro quest for self-determination in the Southern 
Philippines. 
Also, let us look at the emphasis on government as an agency of collective benefits and the 
demand for the fair distribution of wealth and opportunities. Independence movements in the 
Southern are mainly a product of persecution, oppression, and injustice against the Bangsamoro 
people by successive Philippines governments and their agents.  In response, the Bangsamoro 
people moved out from the Philippine institutions and established their organizations like MNLF, 
MILF, and others that provide them protection and recognition of their worth as citizens of the 
country which led to a series of conflicts and often skirmishes between the Philippines government 
and the Bangsamoro, particularly, the Bangsamoro insurgents. 
The decade-long violent armed confrontation in the Southern Philippines is rooted in a 
historical injustice committed by the Manila regimes and its agents against the Bangsamoro people. 
The oppressive Philippines government, national assimilation policies, as well as illegal and 
immoral land-grabbing, and other oppressive and unjust economic measures sanctioned against the 
Bangsamoro community by the former caused the latter a loss of their political and economic 
powers over their homeland, the Bangsamoro homeland. These situations compelled the 
Bangsamoro people to organize independence movements, like MNLF, MILF, etc., to engage in a 
violent protracted war against the Philippines government since the onset of the 1970s. 
Therefore, to address the so-called Bangsamoro problem, Manila regimes signed many 
peace treaties, the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, the Jakarta Final Peace Agreement in 1996, the 
Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro in 2012, and the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Bangsamoro in 2014, with the Bangsamoro revolutionary groups. The first two agreements 
between the Governments of the Philippines with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
failed to address the Bangsamoro question.  As a result, feelings of frustration ran high among the 
Bangsamoro people. One of the most remarkable effects of these frustrations was the combined 
takeover of Maute and ASG over one of the cities of the Philippines, the Marawi City. Worried 
about the possibilities of similar incidents, the Philippines government decided to grant genuine 
autonomy to the Bangsamoro people. This can be seen in the voice of the Senator below:    
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“The Bangsamoro will allow them self-governance that will put an end to their feeling of 
alienation which for decades has fueled their rebellion. He further said that “Mr. President, 
I do not want to sound like a warmonger, but if we do not heed this clamor for change in 
the Bangsamoro, God forbid, restlessness among the armed groups in Mindanao could go 
out of control. The possibility of another Marawi siege would not be far from the horizon. 
The country can no longer afford more bloodshed. Our generation has suffered long enough 
from the clutches of poverty and the evils of war. Let not our children and their future suffer 
some more. Never Mr. President, never, he concluded.” (Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri, 28 
February 2018). 
 
Accordingly, others such as the vehement and mounting of opposition by the Christian-
Filipinos in the country, in general, and the Christian-Filipino settlers (including some Bangsamoro 
leaders who are benefitting from the current broken Philippine system) in the South, against 
Bangsamoro Autonomous Regional in Muslim Mindanao known as Bangsamoro Organic Law or 
BOL that was ratified by the Philippine Congress and signed by Philippines President Rodrigo Roa 
Duterte under Republic Act 11054 in July 2018. Opponents of the Bangsamoro BOL raised issues 
of legality such as the unconstitutionality of sharing arrangements between the Central government 
and the envisioned future Bangsamoro regional government. They also raised the status of 
Indigenous People (IPs) and Christian-Filipino settlers within the Bangsamoro territory. In this 
regard, the opponents of the Bangsamoro Basic Law or BBL (now BOL) argued that the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB), in general, and the passing of the BOL, in 
particular, would require amending the 1987 Constitution as it plans to create a Bangsamoro 
sovereign state and its eventual separation from the Philippines which many experts disagreed. 
However, the “Mamasapano incident” gave ammunition for the anti-BBL groups to block 
the passage of the BBL by the Philippines Congress. It was an incident (the Mamasapano) that 
happened during a Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippines National Police (PNP) (allegedly 
joined by United States Army Special Forces) against the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters 
(BIFF) and the MILF to capture or kill wanted Malaysian terrorist and bomb-maker Zulkifli Abdhir 
and other Malaysian terrorists or high-ranking members of the BIFF which took place on January 
25, 2015, at Tukanalipao, Mamasapano, Maguindanao, Philippines. Consequently, several 
legislators pressed for the deletion of some of the provisions of the proposed law (BBL) which they 
considered to be unconstitutional, including the establishment of separate constitutional bodies, as 
well as the establishment of a Bangsamoro police force in the proposed autonomous region which 
the MILF warned the former not to do. The MILF insisted that any revised BBL version which is 
not FAB and CAB compliant would not be acceptable to them. In the end, in February 2016, the 
leadership of both Houses (the House of the Senate and the House of Representative) declared that 
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they can no longer pass the BBL due to a lack of quorum on the House of the Representative which 
the MILF called as an excuse. 
Nonetheless, for the supporters of the GPH-MILF peace process, in general, and, the BOL, 
in particular, they believed that their supports have been anchored in the very letter and spirit of 
the 1987 Philippine Constitution whose primary objective is for the achievement of peace and 
development for its people including the Bangsamoro. To substantiate their arguments, they 
highlighted the primacy of peace and stability in the country as a whole that can only be achieved 
through the recognition and entrenchment of the BOL in the 1987 Philippines Constitution through 
a legislative process (Philippine News Agency, 9 May 2017; Abubakar, 2017). 
Fortunately, the current administration of Philippine’s President Rodrigo Roa Duterte was 
determined to solve the Bangsamoro problem by addressing what they called historical injustice. 
To accelerate the process, President Duterte certified the bill as an urgent bill. As a result, the 
Philippine Congress was able to prioritize the passage of the bill and ratified it in July 2018 as 
pointed out earlier. Then, on 27 July 2018 Dawan (2018) revealed that Philippine President Duterte 
signed Republic Act No. 11054, or Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao into law. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the above analysis, the article demonstrated empirical evidence which indicated 
the function of ethnoreligious politics in aiding both individuals and groups to promote, preserve 
and advance their respective interests. As such, we can safely conclude that many people in the 
Philippines have been unified together from time to time by ethnoreligious bonds because they 
used it (ethnoreligious politics) to secure their material goals, to satisfy their psychic needs, and on 
some occasions, to bring about fundamental changes in civic values to their favors. And, finally, 
the authors recommend that the GPH should provide a conducive environment that would address 
the cause of ethnoreligious politics in the southern Philippines, to eliminate them.  
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